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Contrary to received wisdom, some recent studies report a negative 
relationship between leverage and profitability in banking in the 
1980s and early 1990s. This study presents new data on the leverage 
and profitability of Swedish commercial banks in 1870–2001, and 
explores the sign of the relationship in the long term. In the studied 
period, the capital-asset ratio decreased by a factor four, while re-
turn-on-equity more than doubled. The “leverage formula” postu-
lates a positive linear relationship between return-on-equity and 
the debt-equity ratio. A strong positive linear relationship was 
found over the period 1871–1980, but not in 1980–2001. Thus, while 
supporting the results of the previous studies, a long-term “nor-
mal” positive relationship between leverage and profitability is also 
reaffirmed.  
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1  Introduction  
In banking as in any industry, it is common knowledge that 
higher leverage normally means higher returns (but also 
greater risk). Yet, two recent studies actually find a negative 
relationship between leverage and returns in banking. Ber-
ger (1995) reports a statistically significant positive relation-
ship between return-on-equity (ROE) and the capital-asset 
ratio (CAR, the inverse of leverage) among American banks 
in the 1980s. Likewise, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) 
study 80 countries in the years 1988–1995, and they also re-
port a statistically significant positive relationship between 
capital and returns.  
These results are indeed surprising. That leverage in-
creases returns seems to follow directly from the very nature 
of business. In its strongest form, the “leverage formula” 
predicts that return-on-equity should increase linearly with 
the debt-equity ratio (DER). How can this be reconciled with 
the empirical results? Berger (1995) suggests that more capi-
talised banks were able attract higher earnings because of 
lower expected bankruptcy costs, which enabled them to pay 
lower interest on uninsured debt. In a similar vein, Flannery 
and Rangan (2002) also report a capital build-up among US 
banks in 1986–2000, and they attribute this build-up to an 
increasingly competitive environment in the last two dec-
ades, promoting banks to hold capital beyond legislative 
needs (market discipline). Another possibility is that the 
negative correlation between leverage and profitability could 
reflect special circumstances of the 1980s and early 1990s. 
The 1980s was a decade of financial liberalisation, and the 




there is small variation in banks’ leverage. The difference in 
leverage among banks, at least in Europe and in North 
America, is small. Conceivably, successful banks could tend 
to be both more capitalised and more profitable in the short 
run, which could obscure the fundamental positive correla-
tion between leverage and returns.  
It would therefore be of interest to see whether the re-
ported relationship holds also in the long term. The long-
term variation in bank leverage is large – capital-asset ratios 
were 15–20 percent at the turn of the 19th century, while they 
are about 5 percent today. Has this development had any 
influence on bank returns?  
This paper uses industry-level data for Sweden in the 
years 1870–2001 to study this very question. The main result 
is that there is indeed a strong positive long-term relation-
ship between leverage and profitability in banking. In accor-
dance with the “leverage formula”, return-on-equity in-
creased linearly with the debt-equity ratio over the period. 
However, the relationship was not present in the 1980s and 
1990s. Thus, while the study reaffirms a long-term “normal” 
positive relationship between leverage and profitability in 
banking, the results of the previous studies are supported.  
Studies of the long-term (century-long) relationship be-
tween leverage and profitability in banking are rare. With 
regard to leverage, Berger et al. (1995) present data on the 
CAR of the US banking system in 1840–1990. Likewise, Saun-
ders and Wilson (1999) compare changes in the CAR of the 
banking systems in Canada, the United States and the 
United Kingdom, 1893–1992. Capie and Billings (2001a, 




English banks in 1920–1968. Their work is further discussed 
below.  
This paper contributes in two ways. First, it contributes 
to the methodological discussion initiated by Capie and Bill-
ings (2001a, 2001b) on how to measure capital in the pres-
ence of hidden reserves. Second it quantifies and tests the 
long-term relationship between leverage and profitability in 
banking, something that – to my knowledge – has previously 
not been done.  
2  Measuring bank capital  
The data are taken from the Summary of the Bank Reports 
(Sammandrag af bankernas uppgifter). Chartered banks were 
required to report monthly balance statements to the Swed-
ish Bank Supervisory Authority (Bankinspektionen). I use ag-
gregated income statements and end-of-year balance state-
ments, for the years 1870–2001. Two problems make it diffi-
cult to get accurate and comparable measures of bank capital 
for the whole period. First, the Summary Reports do not 
show hidden reserves, and reservations made to them, par-
ticularly in the period 1948–1968. Second, corporate tax rates 
varied, from almost zero in the 19th century, to over 50 per-
cent in the 1970s. How should profits and hidden reserves be 
“taxed” over the whole period? These two problems are dis-
cussed in this section.  
2.1 Estimating hidden reserves  
Capie and Billings (2001a, 2001b) discuss how to measure 
true profits and capital of the six major British banks in 




similar to those of the Swedish ones, both in scope and in 
time. In Britain before 1969 (the year of “disclosure”), hidden 
reserves did not show up in official reports, since they were 
either netted away or hidden within deposit accounts. Simi-
larly, in Sweden before 1968, Write-offs and Reservations 
(Avskrivningar och Avsättningar) were not separated in official 
reports. Before 1948, banks made reservations to so called 
delcredere accounts, which were hidden within ordinary 
deposit accounts. In 1948, banks instead started to make res-
ervations to so called Valuation Reserve Accounts, VRAs. 
Before 1968, these were hidden in the reports within a large 
entry called Sundry Accounts. From 1968 they show up 
separately. From 1983 they are called Untaxed Reserves. The 
problem with these hidden reserves is a serious caveat. It 
becomes impossible to accurately calculate actual capital, as 
well as actual operating profits, and therefore impossible to 
calculate both leverage and profitability accurately. Since 
these reserves at the end of the 1960s were as large as re-
ported equity, estimations of the CAR and ROE may be mis-
leading. To get the actual values of reserves and reserva-
tions, as opposed to reported ones, it would be necessary to 
consult the internal accounts of each bank. To do this for the 
whole banking system is at worst impossible, and at best a 
Herculean effort beyond the time limits of this study. I will 
instead estimate reserves and reservations (and losses) for 
the years 1948–1968, as explained below. But before that, I 
discuss some previous estimates of hidden reserves in Swed-




Delcredere accounts prior to 1948: Svenska Handelsbanken 
An indication of the size and use of delcredere accounts may 
be had from Hildebrand (1971), who publishes various bal-
ance sheet data for Svenska Handelsbanken, one of the larg-
est Swedish banks, for the period 1871–1970. Concerning 
write-offs, there are two periods when transactions to and 
from delcredere accounts are reported. In 1919–1920, report 
notes indicate that reservations were made to delcredere 
accounts, which were resolved in 1922. In 1936–1937, report 
notes indicate that sums from delcredere accounts were re-
solved. Although these notes cannot be said to be an exhaus-
tive report of the use of delcredere accounts by the Svenska 
Handelsbanken, they nevertheless could be indicative. For 
banks with a dispersed set of owners, in particular joint 
stock banks like Svenska Handelsbanken, hidden reserves 
possibly did not play a large role until the time before and 
after the crises of 1922 and 1932. Hidden reserves were also 
probably depleted during these crises. Reservations to del-
credere accounts may have increased in the immediate af-
termath of the crises, but were partly resolved after some 
years when the crisis was thought to be over. The Summary 
Reports in the 1930s contain entries for “income from previ-
ously written-off claims” that indicate this. Reservations to 
delcredere accounts were probably more sporadic and less 
systematic than those made later to the valuation reserve 
accounts.  
Hidden reserves 1945–1969: Stockholms Enskilda Bank 
In Sweden, the only attempt at calculating hidden reserves is 
Olsson (1986, p. 216), who calculates hidden reserves for 




of the largest Swedish commercial banks. Olsson’s method is 
to compare the book value of the asset portfolio with its 
market value. The difference is treated as hidden reserves. 
Olsson thus incorporates potential, unrealised profits into 
the measure of capital. By this method, he finds that hidden 
reserves were about as large as visible equity for the whole 
period.  
There are a number of reasons why it could be inappro-
priate to use Olsson’s estimates as a measure of the hidden 
reserves of the banking system. First, the case of Stockholms 
Enskilda Bank can be said to be atypical. The Stockholms 
Enskilda Bank had a larger share of foreign business com-
pared to other banks, which created greater opportunities to 
undervalue foreign assets (Olsson 1986). Also, this bank was 
exceptional in that it was much more of an old-fashioned 
banker’s firm, rather than a modern joint stock bank 
(Lindgren 1987). It was controlled by one family and book-
keeping could therefore be more informal. In addition, as 
Olsson (1986, p. 226) writes, the Stockholms Enskilda Bank’s 
policy of consolidation through hidden reserves was very 
much an outcome of the personality of Jacob Wallenberg, 
who was the bank’s CEO in 1927–1946. According to Olsson, 
it was during this period that the hidden reserves were 
mainly accumulated.  
Second, Olsson’s method of incorporating unrealised 
profits into capital may be questioned. Capie and Billings 
(2001a, 2001b) reject this method. First, unrealised profits are 
hypothetical. Second, banks may not regard unrealised prof-
its as part of their capital. Furthermore, unrealised profits 
calculated on the basis of market prices of assets may be de-




measure should be the liquidation value of the asset portfo-
lio. In case of default, the liquidation value of a large bank’s 
assets may be substantially lower than what is indicated by 
their market value during “normal” times. For these reasons, 
Capie and Billings adopt a “flow” concept of profits that 
excludes unrealised profits. Correspondingly, only actually 
existing reserve accounts, and not unrealised profits, are 
treated as hidden reserves.  
Summing up, since hidden reserves prior to 1948 cannot 
be estimated in a meaningful way, I will follow the path of 
Capie and Billings (2001a, 2001b) and not try to give num-
bers to reserves that cannot be meaningfully estimated. I will 
also follow their methodology and not include potential, 
unrealised profits in the measure of capital. Hidden reserves 
before 1948 will therefore be assummed to be zero. Hence, 
reserves prior to 1948 are probably underestimated. This fact 
should however not interfere with the main finding of this 
paper, namely that of a secular decline in bank capital over 
the period 1870–2001. On the contrary, if capital in the early 
half of the studied period is underestimated, then “true” 
figures would act to enforce the secular decline. 
Estimating VRAs 1948–1968 
The valuation reserve accounts, or VRAs, were zero in 1947. 
Since they are reported in the Summary Reports from 1968 
and onwards, aggregate credit losses (depreciation on finan-
cial assets) for 1948–1968 may be calculated by the formula  
Credit Losses 1948–68  = Write-offs 1948–68 – VRAs 1968.  




The Summary Reports contain specific entries for the write-
offs of claims, bonds and stocks. VRAs exist for bonds, claims 
and currencies. Two complications make the use of formula 
(1) less straightforward. First, write-offs and VRAs do not 
match – how should write-offs on stocks be matched with 
VRAs for currencies? Second, there is the question of how to 
measure reserves in bonds. In the Summary Reports from 
1968 and onwards, total reserves are calculated as VRAs for 
claims and currencies, plus the excess value of the bond portfo-
lio. This entity is calculated as market value – (nominal value – 
VRA for bonds). The bond portfolio is in its turn reported 
“net” in the assets column of the balance statement, that is, 
in nominal value minus VRA for bonds.  
This method has two shortcomings. First, it includes into 
the books potential but non-realised losses on bond sales. 
This would seem to distort the measure of operating profits. 
Second, reserves and thus book capital become sensitive to 
the market fluctuations of the bond portfolio. Since the mar-
ket value of the bond portfolio is sensitive to the interest 
rate, book capital would become sensitive to the interest rate. 
This may create swings in ROE that may not reflect operating 
profitability.  
I will therefore use the more straightforward method to 
treat the VRAs for bonds as hidden reserves. In the calcula-
tion of the CAR below, the gross measure of assets will con-
sequently be used, that is, reported assets plus the VRA for 
bonds. Table 1 shows VRAs, write-offs and estimated losses, 




Table 1 VRAs, write-offs and estimated losses 1948–1968 (MSEK).  
 Claims  Bonds  Stocks  Currencies Aggregate 
VRAs 1968  1390  824  -  126  2341 
Write-offs 1948–68  1733  853  83  -  2669 
Losses 1948–68  474  29  83  –126  460 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports. Losses 1948–68 = Write-offs 
1948–68 minus VRAs 1968. VRA 1968 for claims include inflow 1948–
1968 of previously written-off claims, 132 million SEK.  
Aggregate losses were approximately equal to the losses on 
claims. Losses on stocks and bonds could then approxi-
mately be set to zero. Write-offs on bonds and stocks may be 
treated as reservations made to the VRA for currencies. As a 
first approximation, then, aggregate losses are equal to the 
losses on claims.  
The problem then becomes how to assess the time pat-
tern of these losses. This act must necessarily be more or less 
arbitrary.1 One possible pattern is given in Figure 1, where 
write-offs and estimated losses in 1933–1975 are shown: 
                                                      
1 Since credit losses were very small, small fluctuations in their 




Figure 1  Write-offs and assumed losses on claims, 1933–1975 
(MSEK).   
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports. Write-offs 1968–1975 = “ac-
knowledged losses” (konstaterade förluster).  
Losses have been calculated so that aggregate write-offs in 
1948–1968 minus aggregate losses in 1948–1968 will equal 
VRA for claims in 1968. I assume that losses were constant 
until the middle of the 1950s, and then they started to rise to 
the reported value of “acknowledged losses” in 1968.  
2.2 Tax rates on profits and reserves 
How should hidden reserves be treated from a fiscal point of 
view, that is, how much of them should be regarded as eq-
uity, and how much as unpaid taxes? In a long-term study of 
this kind, the question becomes important, since tax rates 
varied from zero at the turn of the 20th century, to almost 60 
percent in the 1970s. Depending on assumptions, capital 





















rate is radically changed. For example, the corporate tax rate 
was raised from 16 to 40 percent in 1940. Historic Swedish 
corporate tax rates are presented in Hortlund (2005, Chapter 
III of this volume).  
There is no definite answer to the question. One view is 
to treat untaxed reserves simply as deferred tax payments, 
wherefore  they should be “taxed” at the going rate. Accord-
ing to a second view, untaxed reserves should not be “taxed” 
at all, since they will typically never be dissolved for taxa-
tion. In practice, they would only be dissolved to cover 
losses when profits are negative, in which case the tax rate 
would be zero. A third view takes a middle road between 
the two extremes. It acknowledges that reserves should not 
be fully “taxed”, since they will never in practice be fully 
taxed. On the other hand, they should be somewhat “taxed”, 
since the funds are not at the free disposal of the owners, and 
thus not at par with equity. Untaxed reserves could therefore 
be taxed at a rate that is lower than the going rate.  
In this study, all three approaches will be used. I use 
numbers for operating profits and reserves where they have 
been “taxed” at a three different rates, namely at the rate of 
zero, at the going rate, and at a uniform rate of 30 percent. 
With a uniform tax rate, operating profitability can be com-
pared over time. 30 percent is chosen because it is roughly 
the current Swedish corporate tax rate.2  
The diagrams presented below show return-on-equity 
and capital ratios where untaxed reserves and profits have 
been “taxed” with a uniform tax rate of 30 percent. However, 
regressions were also made with return-on-equity and capi-
                                                      




tal ratios calculated on the basis of untaxed as well as going-
rate taxed profits and reserves. It turns out that the results 
were not affected. In fact, as Table 4 below shows, the rela-
tionship between leverage and profitability seems to be even 
stronger for the latter two specifications.  
3  Leverage and profitability of the 
Swedish commercial banks, 1870–
2001 
This section presents figures for the leverage and profitabil-
ity of the Swedish commercial banks, 1870–2001. Figures for 
the capital-asset ratio, return-on-equity, and the (average) 
debt-equity ratio are presented. Variables are defined as in 
Table 2.  
Table 2 Definitions of variables.  
Variable   Definition 
Untaxed Reserves     1948–1982: VRAs 
1983– : reported values 
Capital   C  Equity + 70 percent of  
Untaxed Reserves 
Assets    A  Reported assets + VRA for bonds 
Profits   P  70 percent of operating profits  
(revenues – costs – credit losses) 
Capital-asset ratio   CARt C t  / At 
Return-on-equity    ROEt P t  / Ct-1 
Debt-equity ratio   DERt ((At + At-1) / 2) / Ct-1 – 1 




3.1 The capital-asset ratio  
Figure 2 shows the capital-asset ratio for the Swedish com-
mercial banks in the period 1870–2001:  
Figure 2 Capital-asset ratio of the Swedish commercial banks, 
1870–2001.  
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
In 1870–1895 the CAR decreased. This was a period when 
deposit banking rapidly expanded. Then an upward trend 
started that peaked in 1911. From 1895 to 1910, the number 
of banks grew from 45 to 80. The upward trend in the CAR 
therefore probably reflects an inflow of equity into the bank-
ing sector. From 1911, the CAR started to drop. It declined 
rapidly during WWI, reaching a minimum in the post-war 
recession in 1922. It then remained remarkably stable during 
the new gold period in 1924–1931. The CAR then sharply 
dropped in 1932 – the year of the Kreuger crash, when gold 


















after this one-time drop, the CAR again remained stable 
through the rest of the 1930s. Then a period of secular de-
cline followed that started in 1940. In this year, inflation took 
off, corporate taxes were raised, and foreign-exchange con-
trols were imposed. The CAR dropped steadily between 1940 
and 1980. Since the early 1980s, it has remained rather stable 
at about 6 percent.  
One may compare Figure 2 with the figures of the CAR 
for the US, UK and Canada presented by Berger et al. (1995) 
and Saunders and Wilson (1999). The CAR of the Swedish 
commercial banks conforms to the pattern in these countries 
of a secular downward trend, with a particularly sharp drop 
during WWI. The upward trend in 1895–1911 seems unique 
for Sweden, however. Also, the long secular drop in 1940–
1980 appears to be special for Sweden – the CARs of the other 
countries were stabilised after WWII.  
3.2 Return-on-equity  
Figure 3 depicts return-on-equity of the Swedish commercial 




Figure 3 Return-on-equity of the Swedish commercial banks, 1871–
2001.  
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
The stability of the ROE during the classical gold standard – 
particularly in 1890–1914 – is eye-catching. During WWI there 
was a sharp rise in profitability, ending in a recession in 1922 
when profits for the first time turned negative. Profitability 
then recovered to pre-war levels. Sweden readopted the gold 
standard in 1924–1931. Notice the increase in profits during 
tha latter half of the 1920s, peaking in 1929. From that date 
they dropped. In the ill-fortuned year of 1932 profits turned 
negative for the second time. Beginning in 1942, ROE began 
to increase secularly. It nearly doubled in the Bretton Woods 
period, compared to the levels of the classical gold standard. 
After Bretton Woods from 1971, ROE rose sharply – it dou-
bled again. This era ended in 1991, when the largest banking 



















to levels more reminiscent of those during the Bretton 
Woods period.  
Return-on-equity and inflation 
Figure 3 shows returns in “nominal” terms, that is, disre-
garding inflation. It is widely held that inflation affects prof-
its and this should be adjusted for. Table 3 shows average 
return-on-equity for selected time periods in “nominal” 
terms and in “real” terms, when the change in the Consumer 
Price Index have been deducted from ROE.  
Table 3 Average “real” and “nominal” return-on-equity for the 
Swedish commercial banks, 1871–2001.  
 1871-1915 1945–1970 1971–1990 1995–2001 
Price  inflation 1% 4% 8% 1% 
“Real” ROE  5%  7%  13%  13% 
“Nominal”  ROE  5%  11% 22% 14% 
Sources: Summary of the Bank Reports, Statistics Sweden.  
Even in ”real” terms, ROE was 160 percent higher in 1970–
2001 than it was during the classical gold standard, and 
about 90 percent higher than during the period of the Bret-
ton Woods system.  
4  Return-on-equity and the debt-
equity ratio  
Now for the main event. Figures 2 and 3 revealed that in the 
period 1870–2001, ROE more than doubled, while the CAR 
decreased by more than half. This points to a positive long-
term relationship between leverage and returns. The “lever-




tion between return-on-equity and the debt-equity ratio, ac-
cording to the expression  
DER b l l ROE ⋅ − + = ) ( ,          
 (2) 
where  l is return-on-assets, and (l – b) is the rate gap (or 
margin) between return-on-assets and return-on-debt b.3 
Figure 4 shows ROE and the DER for the Swedish commercial 
banks, 1871–2001.  
Figure 4 Return-on-equity and the debt-equity ratio of the Swedish 







































Source: Summary of the Bank Reports. White dots mark WWI pa-
per regime, 1915–1923. Negative returns in 1922, 1932, 1991–1993 
not shown.  
A linear pattern can be discerned. Because the DER increased 
rather steadily through time, it is possible to classify the dots 
                                                      




as belonging to certain monetary regimes. For a period of 
sixty years 1870–1930, points are clustered around profit 
levels of 6 percent and debt-equity ratios between 3 and 5 
(disregarding some high- ROE points in the first half of the 
1870s and during the WWI paper regime). Following the 
Kreuger crash in 1932, the DER jumps to a new level. In the 
early 1940s ROE begins to increase linearly with the DER. The 
trend continues when the Bretton Woods system is adopted 
in 1951. The trend continues also when the system is aban-
doned in 1971. Because of high leverage, the period 1972–




The following model is estimated:  
u dummies crisis dPRICE dDER dROE + + + = ] [ 2 1 β β  , 
(3a) 
where 
t t t t u u u ε ρ ρ + + = − − 2 2 1 1   .            
(3b) 
Dependent variable is dROE, the change in return-on-equity. 
Independent variable is the change in the debt-equity ratio 
(dDER). The change in the inflation rate (dPRICE) is used as a 
control variable, in the spirit of section 3 – ceteris paribus an 
increase in the inflation rate should tend to increase the rate 
of returns. Also, dummy variables for financial crisis years 




years with negative profits (1922, 1932, 1991–1993). Since the 
crisis of 1993 will heavily affect the difference between ROEs 
in 1993 and 1994, a dummy for the year 1994 is also in-
cluded. The crisis dummies are necessary for there to be a 
statistically significant relationship between leverage and 
returns.  
Regressions are performed on differences rather than on 
levels. This is because the augmented Dickey-Fuller test for 
unit roots reveals that while ROE is stationary on levels, the 
DER is non-stationary. Both variables are stationary on dif-
ferences. Moreover, because both autocorrelation and het-
eroscedasticity can be detected, I estimate the model (by 
maximum likelihood) with two lags in the disturbance term, 
and where Huber-White standard errors are used.  
Table 4 shows regression results. It turns out that they 
are sensitive to the specification with regard to the dummies 
for 1991–1994. More exactly, whether a dummy for 1993 
(CR93) is included or not. Although returns were strongly 
negative in this year (–0.25 percent), the difference in returns 
compared to those of 1992 is actually small. Although the 
coefficient for CR93 is statistically insignificant, its inclusion 
or exclusion affects the statistical significance of the coeffi-
cient for dDER. Therefore, regressions with and without 




Table 4 Maximum likelihood estimation on differenced return-on-
equity.   
Dependent variable dROE 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)  (vii)  (viii) 
Tax  rate  0% Going  30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 



























































































Obs.   130  130  130  130  62 41 22  109 
DW  2.04 2.02 2.03 2.03 2.01 1.83 1.91 1.96 
Note: Huber/White standard errors. p-values in parentheses. Bold 
denotes statistical significance on the five-percent level, and bold-
italics on the one-percent level. Dummies for the years 1922, 1932, 
1991, 1992, 1993 (reported), and 1994. (o.s.) = “out of sample”.  
Columns (i–iii) show results for the basic full-sample regres-
sion with different tax rates on profits and reserves. Results 
are not greatly affected by the choice of tax rate – in fact, the 
relationship between ROE and the DER is slightly stronger 
both when profits and reserves are taxed at the going rate as 
well as when they are not taxed, compared to when they are 
taxed at 30 percent. Regressions (iii–iv) illustrate how the 
result is affected by CR93. Including the variable in the full-
sample regression makes the coefficient of dDER well-nigh 




makes the coefficient significant at the 1 percent level. This 
suggests that a positive long-term relationship between lev-
erage and profitability can be found – but the relationship 
does not seem to be robust. However, regressions (v–viii) 
reveal how the result depends on the years 1980–2001. Re-
gression (v) establishes that the dDER is not significant when 
the sample is 1940–2001. However, it is significant when the 
years 1980–2001 are excluded, as regression (vi) shows. In-
deed, no relation between dROE and dDER can be found in 
1980–2001 (regression vii). Regression (viii) drives home the 
point: when regressing on the almost full sample 1872–1980, 
the dDER is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
  In sum, a strong positive correlation between return-on-
equity and the debt-equity ratio was found in 1872–1980. 
However, the correlation was not present in 1980–2001. In 
this sense, this study supports the previous results of Berger 
(1995), and Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga (1999). But these 
latter results could possibly reflect special conditions of the 
1980s and 1990s. In the long term, the “normal” positive rela-
tionship between leverage and profitability holds, and does 





5  Conclusion  
Two recent studies surprisingly found a negative relation-
ship between leverage and profitability in banking. This 
study presented new data on the Swedish commercial banks 
in 1870–2001, and explored the sign of the leverage-
profitability relationship in the long term. The capital-asset 
ratio decreased from levels around 20 percent at the turn of 
the 19th century, to levels around 5 today. The drop occurred 
particularly during WWI and in 1940–1980. In the same pe-
riod, return-on-equity more than doubled, from about 5 to 
about 13 percent in “real” terms. The “leverage formula” 
postulates a positive linear relationship between return-on-
equity and the debt-equity ratio. This was formally tested. 
Indeed, a strong positive linear relation was found to exist 
over the period 1871–1980, but not in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Results are therefore supportive of those of the previous 
studies. At the same time, a long-term positive relationship 
between leverage and profitability in banking is reaffirmed. 
Over the centuries, at least, the economic laws seem to be 
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